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Abstract: We investigate the eect of education Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs) on
teenage pregnancy. Our main concern is with how the size and sign of the eect may depend on the
design of the program. Using a simple model we show that an education CCT that conditions renewal
on school performance reduces teenage pregnancy; the program can increase teenage pregnancy if it
does not condition on school performance. Then, using an original data base, we estimate the causal
impact on teenage pregnancy of two education CCTs implemented in Bogot a (Subsidio Educativo,
SE, and Familias en Acci on, FA); both programs dier particularly on whether school success is a
condition for renewal or not. We show that SE has negative average eect on teenage pregnancy
while FA has a null average eect. We also nd that SE has either null or no eect for adolescents in
all age and grade groups while FA has positive, null or negative eects for adolescents in dierent age
and grade groups. Since SE conditions renewal on school success and FA does not, we can argue that
the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of our model and that conditioning renewal
of the subsidy on school success crucially determines the eect of the subsidy on teenage pregnancy.
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11 Introduction
In recent years Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs) have been implemented in many
countries around the world; according to the World Bank between 1997 and 2008 the number
of countries that have implemented CCTs increased from 2 to at least 29. Many of these
CCTs have concentrated in increasing school enrolment and have shown to be useful for
this purpose (see for example De Janvry et al., 2006 and Schultz, 2004). However, school
attendance is not the only outcome one may want to aect to improve living conditions of
young individuals around the world. Other outcomes such as those related to sexual behavior,
drug taking or other risky behaviors should also be included in the list. The objective of this
paper is to study the conditions that CCTs must satisfy in order to improve non education
outcomes.
For this purpose we analyze the eect of two large scale education CCTs, implemented
in Bogot a (Colombia), on teenage pregnancy. We use data from the ECSAE survey1 which
was originally constructed for this project and gathers information on several aspects of
sexual behavior of schooled teenagers in Bogot a as well as of socioeconomic conditions and
information about the two education CCTs in place in Bogot a. Given that the two programs
were designed dierently, the dierences in their eects on teenage pregnancy shed light on
the conditions that these programs must fulll in order to improve non education outcomes.
Although there has been controversy about the eects of teenage childbearing, we believe
that for a middle-income country like Colombia there are gains from reducing teenage moth-
erhood.2 First, using data from developed countries the literature has found that although
there is evidence that when proper identication of the relation is done the eects are smaller
than those found in simple correlations the eects are still signicant in many cases (Geron-
imus and Korenman, 1992; Geronimus, 1993; Homan et al., 1993; Angrist and Ewans, 1996;
Levine and Painter, 2003; Holmlund, 2005; Hotz, Mulin and Sanders, 1997; Hotz, McElroy
and Sanders, 2005). Second, there are important reasons to believe that the eects of teenage
childbearing in developing countries may be dierent from those in developed countries. In
particular, developed countries usually have programs to assist teenage mothers or other
programs that reduce the costs associated to school attendance for teen mothers. This can
result in low or negligible eects of teenage childbearing on schooling and employment of the
adolescents or health and schooling of their children. In developing countries these programs
and institutions are scarce so the negative consequences of teenage pregnancy may be more
important. Moreover, particularly important for the case we study, Miller (2010) has shown
that access to family planning methods in Colombia helped postponing the age of rst birth
and implied increasing investments in human capital.
The two main education CCTs implemented in Bogot a (Colombia) are Familias en Acci on
(FA) and Subsidio Educativo (SE). Both programs target poor households, use the same
1. ECSAE stands for Encuesta Sobre el Comportamiento Sexual de Adolescentes Escolarizados en Bogot a
(Survey About Sexual Behavior of Schooled Adolescents in Bogot a).
2. The main trends in teenage pregnancy in Latin America are summarized in Fl orez and N u~ nez (2001) and
Fl orez and Soto (2008). These authors show the existence of high levels of teenage pregnancy rates, a negative
correlation between teenage childbearing and human capital of mothers and strong correlations of teenage
motherhood and socioeconomic results.
2metric to determine elegibility and are similar with respect to size of the subsidy, management
and verication conditions. In both cases school attendance is a minimum requirement to
receive the subsidy. The programs dier mainly in two crucial aspects: the assignment criteria
and the performance requirements to comply with the program.3 Regarding the assignment
criteria, FA goes to the poorest households (SISBEN level 1) and SE goes to the not so poor
households (SISBEN level 2).4 Regarding the conditions to comply with the programs they
both have some performance criteria but dier in their form. SE requires enrolment in the
following grade to continue receiving the transfer, so students must successfully end a year
to continue in the program. This is particularly important for the case of pregnancy since
in most cases a pregnant girl will not be able to successfully nish the year. On the other
hand, in the case of FA attending school is enough to receive the subsidy regardless of success
in the previous year; this means that a girl that became pregnant in the previous year will
continue receiving the subsidy if she repeats the year and complies with the program in all
other aspects. However, FA gives to each student an important amount of money when they
successfully end high school which constitutes a subsidy to nish high school. Both programs
condition the transfer on being younger than 18 years, SE gives money for only two years
while FA has not limit other than age.
The eects of these programs on school enrollment have been studied by Attanasio et al.
(2010) and by Barrera et al. (2011). Attanasio et al. (2011) show that FA has been eective
but restricts the evaluation to the rural Colombia which has very dierent conditions than
the big cities. Barrera et al. (2011) evaluated the pilot of SE. The pilot was implemented in
two of the twelve localities of the city and allowed for three possible ways of designing the
program. The results show that this program can be eective to increase school enrolment
and also show that the way the program is designed matters.
Even if these programs have positive eects on school attendance it is not obvious that
they will have positive eect on non education outcomes. Since these programs also provide
insurance to adolescents they may increase risky behaviors. To show this we use a simple
model that characterizes adolescents' schooling and pregnancy decisions; according to our
model an education CCT that only conditions on school attendance has an ambiguous eect
on teenage pregnancy. We also show that linking the program renewal to school success or
limiting the number of years in which the benets of the program can be claimed resolves
the ambiguity and implies that the CCT also helps reducing teenage pregnancy.
From the description of both programs and from our theoretical results we can expect to
nd that SE reduces teenage pregnancy. The only prediction that can be made for the eect
of FA is that it is smaller than the eect of SE; an increase in teenage pregnancy as a result
of FA is also possible according to our theoretical results. This is precisely what our empirical
results show: on average, SE reduces teenage pregnancy rates while FA has no average eect
3. They also dier in that FA makes part of a broader program that also has a nutrition component grants
additional money to families that have small children for nutrition purposes. It is important to note that when
a household already makes part of the program the appearance of new children is not used to recompute the
transfer the household receives. Consequently, if families understand the program, the nutrition component
should not be an incentive to fertility.
4. SISBEN is the name of the Welfare program in the country. It is based on a socioeconomic index, that
receives the same name, that is used to sort households into ve SISBEN levels. Households in Levels 1 and
2 are the poorest, and households in level 1 are the poorest of the poor.
3on pregnancy rates. When the eect of both programs are disaggregated according to age
and grade SE continues to reduce pregnancy rates for some of the groups considered but FA
may reduce or increase pregnancy rates for some of the groups. The empirical results are in
line with our theoretical results. Given that both programs are quite similar and that in our
regressions we control for socioeconomic background, we can interpret this result as saying
that incentives are crucial if one wants education CCTs to reduce teenage pregnancy rates
or risky behaviors of adolescents. Barrera et al. (2011) have also shown that there are still
several margins that should be considered to improve the eciency of CCTs, our result goes
in the same line as their result. They concentrate on the education outcomes (attendance
and enrollment) of CCTs while our results concern non education outcomes.
Our empirical strategy allows the use of dierences-in-dierences methods to identify the
eect of policies. Similarly to Du
o (2001), the identication strategy relies on intensity
dierences across schools in the implementation of the CCTs to dene the treatment and
the control group (high intensity and low intensity schools). We dene cohorts to introduce
the time dimension: the interviewed girls belong to the young cohort (after treatment) and
their older sisters that attended the same school belong to the old cohort (before treatment).
The comparison of the two cohorts allows us to show that the rate of schoolgirls which
are pregnant or already mothers and attended high intensity SE schools is reduced in two
percentage points with respect to those attending low intensity SE schools. For the case of
FA there is no dierence between high intensity and low intensity FA schools.
Recently three studies have investigated the eect of human capital policies on teenage
pregnancy or on risky behaviors: Baird et al. (2010) using data from Malawi, Du
o et al.
(2006) using data form Kenya and Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) using data from the
US. They all show cases in which education CCTs or other policies to foster human capital
have also reduced teenage pregnancy. However, as we also show with our simple model,
this is not an obvious result. Since these programs also have insurance properties they may
bring an increase in risky behaviors of adolescents. As our empirical results show, to have a
robust CCT that increases school enrolment and reduces teenage pregnancy (and probably
also other risky behaviors) the program must include incentives to school success.5
This paper is composed by seven sections. The rst section is this introduction. Section
2 makes a detailed description of the education subsidies implemented in Bogot a. Section
3 presents a simple model that allows to capture the eects of the two programs. Section
4 presents the empirical strategy that we use to identify causal eects. Section 5 presents
the data and relevant descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents results and robustness checks.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Education Conditional Cash Transfer programs implemented
in Bogot a
Bogot a is an interesting city to study the impact of educational policies that reduce the costs
of human capital accumulation faced by individuals. The government of the city and the
5. Our paper is also related to the literature on the eect of economic incentives on teenage pregnancy, on
this see Wolf, Wilson and Haveman (2001) and Lundberg and Plotnick (1995).
4national government have made large eorts to implement education policies that reduce
school attendance barriers. In this section we describe the two education CCTs, Familias en
Acci on (FA) and Subsidio Educativo (SE), that are currently implemented in Bogot a. FA is
funded by the national government and SE by the government of the city of Bogot a, however
most of the administration of both programs is in the hands of the government of the city
and the Education Oce of the city plays an important role in administration and control of
both programs.
Familias en Acci on is the main Colombian CCT, it started in 2002 in rural areas and
small cities and was extended massively to big cities in 2008. FA targets households that
belong to the poorest population (SISBEN 1).6 Families in the program receive nutrition and
school attendance subsidies; the nutrition subsidies are for children with less than 12 years
and the education subsidies for children older than 12 years. Since the nutrition component
targets children that do not belong to the population in our study we do not describe it; we
must say that the design of the program avoids this component from becoming an incentive
to teenage childbearing. The education component of the program gives to each household
$35,000 Colombian pesos per month per children with ages between 12 and 18 years old
that attends 9th and 10th grades; for children attending 11th grade the subsidy is 14.3%
higher. The education subsidy is conditional on a minimum daily school attendance of the
adolescent; if this condition is satised the household will receive the subsidy until the child
ends or drops out from high school. If the attendance condition is not satised the family
loses the subsidy for the current period but in the following it can regain the benet. Finally,
FA gives to students a lump-sum of $430,000 Colombian pesos when they successfully nish
high school.7
Subsidio Educativo was introduced in 20068 targeting the poorest population of the city
(SISBEN 1 and 2). The program has had two dierent phases, in 2006 and 2007 the program
attended 45,000 beneciaries, randomly chosen from 136,000 applicants, aged 18 years or less
and enrolled in the ocial education system between 6th to 11th grades. In 2007 some new
beneciaries were accepted to keep the original number of 45,000. In 2008 the program was
in place only to attend the students that entered the program in 2007 to replace those that
left the program at the end of 2006.9 Since 2009 the program targets individuals in SISBEN
2.
6. There are several dierences in the way FA been implemented in Bogot a and in the rest of the country, the
description here corresponds to the way it has been implemented in Bogot a.
7. In February of 2010, when our data collection process started, the exchange rate between Colombian pesos
and US dollars was 1953 pesos per US dolar. This means that in that moment the FA nutrition subsidy was
equivalent to US$25.6 for families of children between 0 and 6 years and of US$10.2 for families with children
between 7 and 12 years old. The subsidy per children older that 13 years attending school was equivalent to
US$17.1 and the lump-sum given at the end of high school was equivalent to US$220.
8. In 2005 a small pilot was implemented, the program was extended based on a positive evaluation, see
Barrera et al. (2011).
9. Recall that in 2008 the national government started to implement FA in big cities; during this year
SE was not implemented due to the negotiations between the city and the national government about the
implementation of both programs.
5SE lasts for two years, in 2009 gave $35,000 Colombian pesos10 per month per adolescent
in the household. Payments are done each two months during the 10 months of the schooling
year. The subsidy is implemented with a debit card that is given to the mother when the
student is aged less than 16 years and directly to the student if she has more than 16 years.
As with FA there is a minimum daily school attendance requirement; unlike FA, if this
minimum is not attained students loses denitively the subsidy. The renewal of SE depends
on successfully nishing the academic year.
SE has a variant in which a subsidy to cover transportation costs is granted to students.
But the amount of money that students receive and all the conditions not to lose the subsidy
are the same as with the main variant. The main dierences with the main variant are that
all students attending public schools are eligible independent from social conditions and that
the subsidy targets students that live more than 2 kilometers away from their school.
3 A simple model to capture the eect of education Condi-
tional Cash Transfer programs on teenage pregnancy
According to the description of the two programs that make part of our study we need to
characterize the eects of education CCTs on teen pregnancy that dier in two characteris-
tics: the timing of implicit incentives and the the relation between performance and benets
claiming. We do this with a simple model.
Consider a population of mass one of girls who are attending high school in a given
common grade, g. Time is discrete and is represented by t 2 f1;:::;Tg. Each girl's live spans
T period, all girls discount the future with a common factor  but they dier in age, a, and
in their desire to become mothers, m (m represents the per year money equivalent utility
of being a mother). We assume that m 2 [m;m], a 2 [a;a] with a > 0 and m > 0 and let
f(a;m) represent the distribution function of girls of type (a;m). Since all girls are in the
same grade, they all have to complete the same number of additional years before nishing
high school, this number of years is represented by s. A girl that does not nish high school
will receive a per year wage w, a girl that nishes high school receives a per year wage w +
(with  > 0). If pregnant before ending high school, any girl faces a probability p 2 (0;1)
of nishing high school but she will have to spend additional time  before graduation (this
includes years repeated or time spent out side from school).
To introduce the education CCT program in this stage we make the most 
exible as-
sumption but conserve the main feature of this program: children or their families receive
the subsidy as long as they are attending school. During high school girls receive a transfer
of size et in period t conditional on attending school; let ^ e represent the vector containing all
the values of et.
Motherhood implies no other opportunity costs for girls besides those related to nishing
high school. Accordingly, all girls that nish high school and are not already mothers will
become mothers immediately after nishing high school. At age a the continuation lifetime
10. With the February 2010 exchange rate this is equivalent to US$17.9


































Consequently a girl will become pregnant at age a +  < a + s before ending high school if
va;m()  ua;m, otherwise she will wait until nishing high school to become a mother. Let
a;m be the optimal time to get pregnant for a girl of type (a;m); with a slight abuse of
notation let va;m = va;m (a;m). Monotonicity properties of va;m allow to prove that for any
age a there will be a girl that will be indierent between becoming a mother before nishing
high school and waiting; this marginal girl is dened by
va;m = ua;m: (1)
We denote the type of the marginal by e m(a; ^ e). The rate of age a girls with age attending






where ^ e is a vector containing all the et and it summarizes the characteristics of the CCT.








Any policy that increases e m will reduce rg and ra
g. To show how alternative ways of
designing the CCTs aect teenage pregnancy we consider particular cases chosen to match
the main characteristics of the two Colombian CCTs we analyze in this paper. These are
characteristics that could be considered to be included in any other CCT.
i. The eect of an education CCT that only conditions on school attendance on
teenage pregnancy: Suppose  = 1 and et = e. Note that we are assuming that a girl that
becomes pregnant receives the subsidy every year until she nishes high school if she is lucky
to be able to nish; this means that pregnancy does not make girls leave school temporarily
and that  only represents repeatency.
7All girls with m < e will wait until a + s to become pregnant since for them va;m() is
increasing in . For girls with m > e, va;m() is decreasing in ; this means that any girl
that wants to become a mother before a + s will do so at age a (i.e. m;a = 0). Among girls
for who m > e there will be some that become pregnant before a + s and some that wait.
Using this to write va;m(), equation (1) implies that
se mi (a;e) = [(1   p)(T   a   s   1) + p]   [s   p(s + )](w   e) (4)
Since e mi decreases with a for a given age, girls with higher m will become pregnant more
frequently than girls with low m and for a given m older girls will become pregnant more
frequently. Let r
a;i
g represent the rate of girls that become pregnant under this type of
program; as before r
a;i




e mi(a;e) = [s   p(s + )]=s
which shows that, starting from a situation in which there is no CCT (e = 0) introducing a




The CCT will be eective for teenage pregnancy reduction if the probability of nishing high
school is low or if  is low. In both cases the penalty for teenage pregnancy is big. When
p is low girls perceive high opportunity costs of pregnancy; when  is low girls perceive low
colateral economic benets or prolonged time at school since they will receive the subsidy for
a short additional period. This shows that an education CCT does not necessarily reduce
teenage pregnancy. As we will show now, CCTs can be designed (in theory) to unambiguously
reduce teenage pregnancy.
ii. The eect of limiting the number of years CCT education program: Suppose
that  = 1 and that et = e > 0 for a  t  a+s and et = 0 for t > a+s. As in the previous
case girls with m < e will wait until a + s to become pregnant. Among girls with m > e
there will be a marginal girl that will be indierent between waiting or becoming pregnant
at age a:




e mii(a;e) = 1   p > 0:
Accordingly, introducing an education CCT that conditions benet claiming on performance,
unambiguously reduces teenage pregnancy. Moreover
e mi (a;e)   e mii (a;e) =  pe=s < 0
so e mii > e mi. Let r
a;ii
g represent the rate of girls that become pregnant under this type of
program; as before r
a;ii
g is a function of e.
iii. The eect of conditioning renewal on performance: Suppose now that girls stop
receiving the transfer if they fail to successfully nish the academic year and that et = e > 0
8for all years in which the girls receive the subsidy. In this case girls that will get pregnant at
age a will not receive any benet from the program. This implies that




e miii(a;e) = 1 > 0:
so that introducing a subsidy with the stated rules reduces teen pregnancy. Moreover
e miii (a;e)   e mii (a;e) = pe > 0
so that conditioning the renewal of the subsidy on school success reduces teenage pregnancy
rates. Similar to the previous two cases, let r
a;iii
g represent the rate of girls that become
pregnant under this type of program; as before r
a;iii
g is a function of e.
iv. The eect of the timing of incentives: We need to compare a program with the
structure of any of the three programs considered above (i, ii or iii) but that delays some of
the economic benets for until end of highschool. This case need no formalization since it is
clear that if girls have preference for the future ( < 1), or any sort of myopia any alternative
to the previous three which leaves some resources E until the end of highschool and keeps
constant the nancial costs of the program will have higher pregnancy rates than the original
program. Note that in this case we are not making any implication about the eect of the
program and attendance decisions as the ones analyzed by Barrera et al. (2011).
To summarize we have shown that CCT programs that condition renewal on academic
performance will have higher pregnancy rates than those that do not condition on academic
performance. Programs in which there is a limit on the number of years in which the benets
can be claimed have lower pregnancy rates than those in which there is no limit but still
reduce pregnancy rates. This means that
ra;iii
g (e) < ra;ii
g (e) < ra;i
g (e): (7)
If on top of the conditions of programs in i, ii or iii, some resources are given to the girls
only after they nish highschool the pregnancy rates will be higher than those the specic
program considered with out delaying resources. This means that the form the conditions
take is important for teenage pregnancy; tighter conditions imply lower pregnancy rates and
delaying benets will increase pregnancy rates if girls exhibit preference for the future or
myopia.
4 Empirical strategy
In Section 3 we showed that education CCTs may aect teenage pregnancy and that the
characteristics of the programs may aect this relation. Let the probability of becoming
pregnant for a girl of age a, attending grade g in school j under a CCT with characteristics
represented by ^ e be given by
Prob[ua;m  va;m]  q(^ e;a;j;g):
9Equation (2) suggest that an empirical exercise to capture the dierential eects of two
education CCTs on teenage pregnancy must estimate
q(^ e;0) = q(^ e;a;j;g)   q(0;a;j;g):
Estimating the eects of dierent congurations of e is dicult. Instead, we will identify
the eect of the two education CCTs that have been implemented in the previous years in
Bogot a. Consider then the following probability
Prob[ua;m  va;m]  q(t;a;j;g)
where t indicates whether the girl was treated by one of the two programs t 2 fFA;SEg.
We can then estimate the equation
q(t;0) = q(t;a;j;g)   q(0;a;j;g): (8)
Since the programs are similar enough in most characteristics we can attribute the dierence
in the estimates to dierences in the form in which they are designed.
According to equation (7), when comparing two CCTs, one that conditions renewal on
performance and another that does not, we can expect to nd a lower pregnancy rate under
the rst. As we explained in Section 2 SE conditions renewal on performance and FA does
not. Moreover, our model also shows that a program that does not have a binding limit on the
number of years in which the benets of program can be claimed may have a positive eect on
teenage pregnancy rates. Although FA includes this type of condition, in practice, most girls
in Colombia end high school before 18 years so that the rule might not bind. Consequently
we expect that q(FA;0) > q(SE;0); we can also expect SE to reduce teenage pregnancy
and for FA we may expect to have positive and negative eects depending on whether the
age limit is binding or not.
The treatment variables are dened at the school level. We consider a treatment given by
a dummy variable, so that we split schools in two groups: schools with high treatment and
schools with low treatment. The indicator variable for treatment t, t 2 fFA;SEg in school j
is dened as follows:
Ttj  1l[tj > tj] (9)
where tj denotes the proportion of girls in school j that receive the treatment t and tj
denotes the average proportion of girls receiving treatment t across schools.
Since we have cross-section data we do not have information before and after the treatment
for the same individuals. Instead, in the same vein of Du
o (2001), we dene two cohorts
which dier in their likelihood of having been treated. These two cohorts allow us to use
dierence-in-dierences strategy to identify the causal eect. In our paper the two cohorts
are constructed using information provided by the girls about the older sisters that both
studied in the same school and did not drop out from school. This strategy allows us to
control for school and household unobservables that do not vary across time.
We use the dierence in dierence strategy to identify the causal eect of education
policies on teenage pregnancy. Since we have two treatments, to fully identify the causal
10eect of those treatments we estimate the following equation:
Yij =  + CCi + FATFAj + SETSEj + FSTFAjTSEj +







where Yij is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when woman i who attends or attended
school j has had at least one child during teenage (between 14 and 19 years old) and value
0 otherwise. The cohort to which woman i belongs is given by Ci; Ci takes value 1 if she
is in the young cohort (women aged 14 to 19 who are still attending school) and value 0 if
she is in the old cohort (women aged 19 to 32 and already out from school).11 Ttj identies
whether school j is a high intensity treatment school under program t 2 fFA;SEg according
to equation (9) above; Xij is a vector of individual characteristics; Zj is a vector of school
characteristics, including xed eects by regions of Bogot a.12 This equation corresponds to
a linear version of equation (8) but we allow the possibility of additional controls to include
individual and school characteristics that do not appear in the model of Section 3.
Our main parameters of interest are FA, SE and FS. As already explained the iden-
tication strategy corresponds to a dierence-in-dierence approach taking advantage from
the existence of school with high and low intensity treatment. The causal eect of each treat-
ment will be identied by the estimation of coecients t, t 2 fFA;SEg. The causal eect
of the interaction between any pair of treatments above and beyond the causal eect of each
treatment will be identied by the estimation of coecient FS. Furthermore, we will check
whether there are heterogeneous eects across grades, ages and, grades and ages combined.
We do so by including interactions in equation (10).
As usual, there are several challenges to credibly identify causal eects using this approach.
The key identifying assumption behind the dierences-in-dierences approach is that selection
biases are linear and time-invariant. In other words, if there is any dierence in the pre-
treatment period, this dierence should be stable across time. In order to test the identifying
assumption we run a placebo regression where we only include data from the old cohort. We
split data in two groups by age. Younger old sisters are included in one cohort and older
old sisters in the other one. There must be no eect of treatments across sisters in order to
credibly identify causality estimating equation (10).
A second challenge for our approach comes from the fact that we sub-estimate the like-
lihood of teenage pregnancy of the younger cohort. The reason is that, unlike the older
cohort, not all individuals in the younger cohort have nished their teenage years. We tackle
this problem by controlling for individual age. The younger the girl the less likely teenage
pregnancy. Introducing age as a covariate should correct the expected pregnancy rate for
each cohort.
Another challenge for identifying causal eects comes from the denition of cohorts. On
the one hand, the older cohort must strictly be previous to the treatment in order to be useful
11. Recall that women in the young cohort correspond to the girls interviewed in our eld work and women
in the old cohort correspond to their sisters.
12. Regions in Bogot a are called localidades.
11to identify the causal eect. Since SE started in 2005 and FA in 2008, some women from
the old cohort between 19 and 22 years old have some probability to have been treated. This
fact may bias our results. If any, the bias will be downwards and make our estimates a lower
bound of the true estimator. On the other hand, if we only include sisters older than 22 in
the old cohort we may end up comparing siblings that are not so comparable. Acknowledging
these possible biases in our exercises we make a robustness check in which we run the same
regressions restricting the sample excluding the youngest and the oldest women from the
old cohort.13 In addition, since girls in the young cohort may be linked to more than one
older sister, we make a robustness check in which we restrict the sample to include only the
youngest old sister. This is a kind of acid test to our results because of the downward bias
we explained above.
A fourth challenge to our estimates comes from our denition of the treatment. Our
treatment dummies are based on an ad-hoc threshold (the mean proportion of treated girls
across schools) to separate high intensity and low intensity treatment schools. To be sure
that our results are not driven by this ad-hoc denition we use alternative denitions of the
treatment dummies based on dierent thresholds. To test whether our ndings are driven by
the threshold we run the same regressions by using dierent percentiles. Our results must be
robust to use dierent thresholds.
We further check whether the fact of solely including sisters in the old cohort that did
not dropped out from school plays a role in our results. As a robustness check we make
the same regression including dropping out sisters. Finally, all regressions are performed
clustering residuals at the region level (localidad). To check robustness of standard residuals
we bootstrap errors while clustering at the region level.
Holmlund (2005) has shown that in fertility studies the sibling approach may have the
problem of not recognizing possible changes in time for the household. We believe that our
restrictions on cohorts help reducing this possible source of bias. The cost of doing so is that
we reduce the external validity of our results. Focusing on cohorts that studied in the same
school may reduce the validity of results applied to migrating households. Children from
migrating households may have changed from high-intensity treated to low-intensity treated
schools back and forward.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
As explained in the introduction the empirical analysis uses information from the ECSAE
Survey. This is an original survey of boys and girls enrolled in 273 schools in Bogot a.14 The
eld work to construct this data base took place between the months of February and April
2010. The survey interviewed adolescents between 14 and 19 years enrolled in the three last
years of high school15 in public and private schools. The sample has been selected with a
13. To maintain control on household and school xed eects we also exclude their respective sisters in the
young cohort.
14. The number of schools visited amounts to roughly one fourth of all schools oering 9th, 10th and 11th
grades in the city.
15. In Colombia these correspond to 9th, 10th and 11th grades.
12probability proportional to population size estimated from Bogot a's 9th to 11th enrollment
for the year 2009 so that the survey is representative at the regional level (localidades). For
the purpose of this study only the data from girls is relevant; the nal data base contains
information of 21.262 girls.
The main information of the data base for the purpose of this study is that about teenage
pregnancy and fertility and about the incidence of the CCTs. The survey also collected
socioeconomic information, information on mother and sisters' fertility and education, and
knowledge and use of contraceptive methods. In this section we discuss the information that
is used to evaluate the eect of education policies on teenage pregnancy. For the purpose
of this paper we have also merged to the data base information about school facilities and
school quality that comes from administrative records of the Colombian government. Finally
we have also merged to the data base information about crime incidence and neighborhood
safety at the regional level.
In order to evaluate the impact of the CCTs implemented in Bogot a on teenage pregnancy,
we take advantage of the information collected about older sisters of the interviewed girls.
This information allows us to identify sisters' childbearing, age, age at the rst child was
born, and if the sister studied in the same school the last year attended. From the 21.262
interviewed girls we recovered information on childbearing, age and age at the rst child for
3.598 sisters. As was stated in the empirical strategy section we use the sister's information
to build an old cohort which could be comparable with the interviewed girls, but who were
less likely to be aected by any cash transfer in Bogot a. The old cohort is composed by
sisters that comply all the following conditions: i. 19 to 32 years old, ii. studied in the same
school as their interviewed sisters and iii. did not dropped out from high school. At the end
of this process we nished with a sample of 1.251 sisters (53.35%) in the old cohort and 1.094
interviewed girls (46.65%) in the young cohort (see Tables 2 and 3). Those tables also report
frequencies of girls across treated and non-treated schools for both FA and SE.
In what follows we present some descriptive statistics on teenage pregnancy, individual
characteristics, school quality and conditions of the neighborhood. We compare average char-
acteristics across cohorts (Table 4) and treatment and control groups for both cash transfers
(Tables 5 and 6).16 The rst three columns of each of those tables provide information on
the total sample including recovered information on sisters. The last three columns report
information on the sub-sample used for the econometric exercise. In Table 4 we report data
on the interviewed girls (young cohort) and their older sisters (old cohort). In the full sample
(column 1) the interviewed girls are characterized by a teenage pregnancy incidence of about
3%, their age is around 15 years old in average, the average household has 5.26 members,
their mothers have 3.24 children in average and 24% of the girls study in private schools. The
other variables describe school quality (larger index means higher quality), distance to the
nearest bus station, neighbor security (theft number by thousand inhabitants) and standard
of living (larger index report better standard of living).17
16. Table 1 reports the denition of all variables used in the empirical exercise.
17. Our school quality index is the 5th grade math average score in the SABER examination (a general public
examination implemented by the national government). The living standard index weights dwelling conditions
and socioeconomic achievements (parents' education) of the interviewed girls' family.
13Columns 1, 2 and 3 from Table 4 show that girls in both cohorts, in the original data
base, dier in important ways in several characteristics. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show that the
methodology explained in the previous section makes both cohorts more similar in several
respects, including household' standard of living, size and home rooms, and school's number
of pupils per teacher and proportion of pupils in private schools. This reduces the concerns
of Holmlund (2005) for our empirical analysis.
Comparing treated and control groups for both programs we can see that, in average,
these groups are dierent. For both programs, girls in both cohorts from treated schools (high
intensity) come from poorer and bigger households, study in schools with lower quality and
live in regions exposed to less crime rates than girls from the control schools (low intensity).
Dierences in girls' age are not signicant (see Tables 5 and 6). Dierences are larger for FA
than for SE, which re
ect the fact that FA attends the poorest households.
Table 7 shows the average incidence of pregnancy by cohort and treatment status. Con-
sider rst the eect of SE in the second panel. Notice that the treated schools have higher
teenage pregnancy incidence than control schools before the treatment is implemented (7.4%
against 3.5%). After the treatment both treatment and control schools end up with similar
pregnancy prevalence (2.5% and 2.3%, respectively). The teenage pregnancy incidence de-
creases 1.2 percentage points in the control group and 4.9 percentage points in the treatment
group. Without controlling for observable covariables the causal eect of SE on teenage
pregnancy amounts to a reduction of 3.7 percentage points. A similar analysis shows that
FA seems to have caused an increase in teenage pregnancy of 2.2 percentage points.18
6 Results and robustness checks
The model in Section 3, summarized in equation (7), predicts that an education CCT program
that does not condition on performance and does not limit the number of years in which the
program benets can be claimed will cause higher pregnancy rates than alternative programs
in which these two conditions are included. This is explained by the insurance characteristics
of education CCTs that only condition on school attendance. Moreover conditioning renewal
on school success is more eective to reduce teenage pregnancy than limiting the number of
years in which the subsidy can be claimed. As we will show now, our empirical results are in
line with the predictions of the model.
All results and robustness checks are in the Appendix. In Table 8 we report regressions
without controls. In the rst two columns we include a single treatment. The interaction
between cohort and treatment gives an initial estimate about signicance of causal eects
reported in Table 7. In column 1 we report results of the program Familias en Acci on (FA). In
column 2 we report results of the program Subsidio Educativo (SE). The SE program seems
to reduce teenage pregnancy (column 2) and FA seems to increase it (column 1). However,
once we make estimations including both programs and school xed eects, SE still seems
to reduce teenage pregnancy but FA seems to have no eect, on average (see column 3).
18. Additional descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 19 { 23 where we report covariates by treatment{
cohort and frequencies by grade and grade{age.
14In Table 9 we report estimates of equation (10).19 In column 1 we report results with no
controls. In the following columns we progressively introduce controls at the individual (age),
household (size, number of mother's children, socioeconomic index, and number of rooms at
home), school (student-teacher ratio, quality, private/public and distance to public transport
system) and region (crime rates, xed eects) level, respectively. First of all notice that, the
causal eect of both programs are robust to all specications. Second, FA has no eect on
teenage pregnancy on average and SE causes a reduction of teenage pregnancy. Since the
outcome variable is a dummy the estimation of the eect of SE cannot be interpreted as the
marginal eect. In Table 10 we report marginal eects obtained from probit estimations;
the results are consistent with those in Table 9 and show that SE reduces the incidence of
teenage pregnancy in around two percentage points and that FA has no eect.
As we have argued in the theoretical section age aects the way in which the CCTs
aect girls' decisions; grade may also aect their decisions. To look at this, we ran the same
specication in equation (10) adding interactions with grade and age. Table 11 shows that
the eect of the programs on pregnancy varies across both dimensions. It seems that SE
program reduces pregnancy in all grades. All coecients are negative but only 10th grade's
is signicant. It also seems that the non signicant eect of FA is the net eect of two
opposite eects. The FA program seems to increase pregnancy among girls in 10th grade and
reduce that of girls in 11th grade. The rst eect is signicant and the second is not.
Similar results are obtained when we look at heterogeneous eects across age (see table
12). The SE program reduces teenage pregnancy at all ages20 and the eects on 14, 15 and
17 years old girls are signicant. The FA program has opposite eects depending on age: it
increases pregnancy of 16 years old girls and reduces pregnancy of 18 years old girls. A full
set of interactions between age and grade are reported in Table 13. The reducing eect of
SE program on pregnancy is negative across both grade and age but only signicant for 15
years old girls in all grades. Regarding FA, age plays an important role: relatively old girls
(17 and 18) that receive the transfer reduce their pregnancy. But pregnancy of 16 years old
girls attending 10th grade increases when they receive the transfer.
In Tables 14, 15 and 16 we report the robustness checks corresponding to the challenges
mentioned in the empirical strategy section. In column 2 Table 14 we report results of the
placebo treatment. We split the sample of the old cohort in two: younger sisters (19-22
years old) and older sisters (23-32 years old). We must have no eect in order to validate
the identifying assumption of our approach. As we can see, treatment has no eect on older
cohorts, so we can credibly attribute our ndings to the CCTs. In column 3 we bootstrap
errors. In Column 4 we include in the regression sisters that dropped out from school. And
in column 5 we run the regressions keeping the younger sister the interviewed girls have in
the old cohort. Results are robust to all specications.
In Table 15 we report a sequence of regression in which we test whether our results are
robust to the denition of cohort. In column 1 we report our benchmark regression. In
19. In Table 18 we report estimates of all coecients. It can be seen that controlling for age makes the
cohort coecient change sign. This means that girls from the young cohort are more likely to become teenage
mothers than girls from the old cohort.
20. Only the eect on 18 years old is positive but not signicant. The standard error is four times bigger than
the coecient.
15column 2 we exclude the younger sisters from the old cohort.21 In column 3 we exclude
the older sisters from the old cohort. In column 4 we exclude older sisters and younger
interviewed girls with the aim to have girls of similar age in both cohorts. Our results hold
in all regressions.
Finally, in Table 16 we report results obtained when we change the threshold that denes
the treatment variable. We use dierent percentiles ranging from 30th percentile to 50th
percentile to test whether the choice of an arbitrary threshold drives the result. The causal
eect is robust to thresholds changes.
The theoretical prediction of our model about the link between CCTs and teenage preg-
nancy can be seen from the average eects in our benchmark estimation. Our empirical
ndings show that SE has a negative signicant eect on teenage pregnancy while FA has
a null eect. The renewal of SE is conditioned on school performance since the girl (or her
family) will only receive the subsidy if she gets enroled in the following year. FA does not
condition renewal on performance but limits the number of years in which the subsidy can
be claimed since only families of girls younger than 18 years can claim the subsidy. However,
since most girls are young enough to aord spending one more year in school and still not
losing the subsidy the limit is not binding. This can be seen from Table 23 where it is shown
that for each grade more than half of the girls will receive during one more year the subsidy
if they have to repeat a year since they will still nish high school before becoming 18 years
old. The heterogeneous eects also support these ndings. For none of the groups we have
considered (disaggregated by age and grade) we have found a positive and signicant eect of
SE. However, for FA we found positive and negative signicant eects for particular groups
of girls according to their age and the grade in which they are enrolled.
7 Final remarks
The results in this paper show that not all education Conditional Cash Transfer programs
(CCTs) reduce teenage pregnancy. To show this we compared the eect of two CCTs im-
plemented in Bogot a, Colombia, i.e., Familias en Acci on and Subsidio Educativo. Our main
nding is that Subsidio educativo causes a seizable reduction on teenage pregnancy while
Familias en Acci on has no eect. Even though our data does not allow to identify the spe-
cic channel through which CCTs reduce teenage pregnancy, the main dierences between
the CCTs we have considered are the performance condition and that FA conditions some
benets on successfully nishing high school. Our results can be interpreted as saying that
conditions on academic performance provide girls incentives to reduce pregnancy and that
delaying the rewards of the programs reduce these incentives.
These results show that carefully designing education CCTs is crucial to guarantee that
non education outcomes also improve or at least they do not worsen. Recently a discussion
about the benets of CCTs for education outcomes in the urban world has started; the
benets of these programs are challenged (compared to what happens in the rural world).
Policy makers start to be concerned with dimensions dierent from school attendance in the
21. We also exclude their sisters in the other cohort in order to maintain the siblings approach.
16urban regions of many middle income countries. Our results show that the CCTs may still
be valid but they should be conditioned in variables dierent than simple school attendance.
In this point it is important to note that the conditions that are needed to reduce teenage
pregnancy may be detrimental for other purposes; for example Barrera et al. (2011) discuss
that delaying rewards until the end of high school may help increase attendance to higher
education since that reduces resources constraints that may aect the capacity to pay for
starting costs in higher education. It is also possible that in a world in which students
face psychological costs of attending school including performance conditions may discourage
some students from attending school. These elements make part of the trade os that must
be solved for a good policy design. More research is needed to fully understand the eects of
these policy elements.
17A Tables
Table 1. Variable glossary
Variable Denition
Children Number of mother's children
Cohort Identies cohort, 1: Interviewed girls, 0: Sisters of interviewed girls
Distance Distance of school to nearest Transmilenio station
FA Conditional cash transfers granted by Familias en Acci on
HH Size Household size including the student
Motorcycle theft Motorcycle theft rate (one per thousand inhabitants) by locality
Person theft Thefts to persons rate (one per thousand inhabitants) by locality
Private 1 if she studies in a private school
Rooms Number of rooms in the student's house excluding
kitchen, bathrooms or garages
Sch-quality Average math results of students in 5 year of primary school 2009
SE Conditional cash transfer granted by SED
Standard of living Socioeconomic Index that includes sanitary type,
overcrowding, house's 
oor material and parents' education
Students-teacher Students-teacher relationship (2004 for sisters, 2008 for interviewed)
18Table 2. Treatments Frequency: Percentage
Total Fam. Acci on (FA) Subs. Educ. (SE)
Control Treated Control Treated
Old Cohort 53.35% 37.14% 16.20% 30.32% 23.03%
Young Cohort 46.65% 32.92% 13.73% 26.40% 20.26%
Total 100.00% 70.06% 29.94% 56.72% 43.28%
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
Table 3. Treatments Frequency: number of pupils
Total Fam. Acci on (FA) Subs. Educ. (SE)
Control Treated Control Treated
Old Cohort 1251 871 380 711 540
Young Cohort 1094 772 322 619 475
Total 2345 1643 702 1330 1015
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
19Table 4. Descriptive Statistics by Cohort
Total (n=24860) Sample (n=2345)
Young Old Dierence Young Old Dierence
Pregnancy 0.03 0.03 0.00** 0.02 0.05 -0.03***
Age 15.41 19.23 -3.82*** 15.50 21.82 -6.32***
Standard of living 23.16 22.55 0.61*** 23.03 22.90 0.13
HH Size 5.26 5.72 -0.46*** 5.58 5.66 -0.08
Children 3.24 3.70 -0.46*** 3.59 3.72 -0.13*
Rooms 4.10 4.22 -0.12*** 4.30 4.31 -0.01
Students-teacher 27.02 30.71 -3.69*** 27.04 30.55 -3.51***
Sch-quality 325.47 325.01 0.46 330.63 330.18 0.45
Private 0.24 0.22 0.02*** 0.26 0.25 0.01
Distance 2110.78 2135.72 -24.94 1943.59 1981.26 -37.67
Person theft 1.42 0.77 0.65*** 1.46 0.82 0.64***
Motorcycle theft 0.13 0.15 -0.02*** 0.14 0.17 -0.03***
Two tailed signicance level: ***p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable.
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status:
Subsidio Educativo (SE)
Total (n=24860) Sample (n=2345)
Treated Control Dierence Treated Control Dierence
Pregnancy 0.03 0.02 0.01*** 0.05 0.03 0.02***
Age 15.93 15.96 -0.03 18.81 18.92 -0.11
Standard of living 22.31 23.71 -1.40*** 21.93 23.75 -1.82***
HH Size 5.43 5.24 0.19*** 5.78 5.50 0.28***
Children 3.43 3.21 0.22*** 3.93 3.45 0.48***
Rooms 3.97 4.24 -0.27*** 4.09 4.47 -0.38***
Students-teacher 28.22 26.97 1.25*** 29.18 28.71 0.47
Sch-quality 315.61 333.88 -18.27*** 317.51 340.22 -22.71***
Private 0.00 0.44 -0.44*** 0.00 0.45 -0.45***
Distance 1911.50 2284.16 -372.66*** 1783.96 2100.84 -316.88***
Person theft 1.08 1.53 -0.45*** 0.97 1.23 -0.26***
Motorcycle theft 0.12 0.14 -0.02*** 0.14 0.16 -0.02***
Two tailed signicance level: ***p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable.
20Table 6. Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status:
Familias en Acci on (FA)
Total (n=24860) Sample (n=2345)
Treated Control Dierence Treated Control Dierence
Pregnancy 0.04 0.02 0.02*** 0.04 0.04 0.00
Age 16.02 15.91 0.11*** 18.95 18.84 0.11
Standard of living 21.01 24.06 -3.05*** 20.69 23.93 -3.24***
HH Size 5.62 5.19 0.43*** 5.97 5.47 0.50***
Children 3.61 3.16 0.45*** 4.21 3.42 0.79***
Rooms 3.87 4.24 -0.37*** 4.07 4.41 -0.34***
Students-teacher 29.12 26.79 2.33*** 30.55 28.22 2.33***
Sch-quality 304.19 335.79 -31.60*** 304.34 341.52 -37.18***
Private 0.10 0.31 -0.21*** 0.09 0.33 -0.24***
Distance 2562.71 1899.03 663.68*** 2692.03 1652.48 1039.55***
Person theft 0.92 1.52 -0.60*** 0.75 1.28 -0.53***
Motorcycle theft 0.10 0.15 -0.05*** 0.10 0.17 -0.07***
Two-tailed signicance level: ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1.
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable.
Table 7. Descriptive Di-in-Di in Teenage Pregnancy
Familias en Acci on (FA) Subsidio Educativo (SE)
Control Treated Dierence Control Treated Dierence
Old Cohort 0.053 0.050 -0.003 0.035 0.074 0.039
Young Cohort 0.018 0.037 0.019 0.023 0.025 0.002
Dierence -0.035 -0.013 0.022 -0.012 -0.049 -0.037
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
Table 8. Regressions without controls
(1) (2) (3)
Cohort x FA 0.0219** 0.0176
(0.0103) (0.0165)
Cohort x SE -0.0363* -0.0453**
(0.0182) (0.0208)
School FE X
Observations 2,345 2,345 2,345
Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
21Table 9. General Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cohort x FA 0.0176 0.0130 0.0128 0.00892 0.0129
(0.0165) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0188) (0.0208)
Cohort x SE -0.0453** -0.0479** -0.0482** -0.0454** -0.0434**
(0.0208) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0198)
School FE X X X X X
Age X X X X
Family controls X X X
School controls X X
Localidad X
Observations 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345
Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
Table 10. Probit
(1) (2)
Cohort x FA 0.0187 0.0230
(0.0234) (0.0218)








Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
22Table 11. Heterogeneous Eects 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cohort x FA 0.0129 0.0135
(0.0208) (0.0208)
Cohort x FA 9th grade 0.00916 0.00839
(0.0337) (0.0326)
Cohort x FA 10th grade 0.0486** 0.0523**
(0.0186) (0.0192)
Cohort x FA 11th grade -0.00936 -0.00945
(0.0218) (0.0226)
Cohort x SE -0.0434** -0.0427**
(0.0198) (0.0199)
Cohort x SE 9th grade -0.0217 -0.0207
(0.0178) (0.0173)
Cohort x SE 10th grade -0.0586** -0.0622***
(0.0207) (0.0208)
Cohort x SE 11th grade -0.0402 -0.0362
(0.0295) (0.0299)
Observations 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345
Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Cohort and school xed eects included in all regressions
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
23Table 12. Heterogeneous Eects 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cohort x FA 0.0129 0.0128
(0.0208) (0.0208)
Cohort x FA age 14 -0.00212 -0.00576
(0.0215) (0.0226)
Cohort x FA age 15 0.0237 0.0265
(0.0238) (0.0206)
Cohort x FA age 16 0.0476* 0.0455**
(0.0229) (0.0187)
Cohort x FA age 17 -0.0143 0.00966
(0.0365) (0.0481)
Cohort x FA age 18 -0.0675* -0.102*
(0.0360) (0.0513)
Cohort x SE -0.0434** -0.0436**
(0.0198) (0.0198)
Cohort x SE age 14 -0.0379 -0.0308
(0.0250) (0.0227)
Cohort x SE age 15 -0.0460** -0.0479**
(0.0194) (0.0172)
Cohort x SE age 16 -0.0266 -0.0354
(0.0280) (0.0289)
Cohort x SE age 17 -0.0924** -0.0895*
(0.0371) (0.0453)
Cohort x SE age 18 0.000644 0.0527
(0.0776) (0.0872)
Observations 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345
Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Cohort and school xed eects included in all regressions
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
24Table 13. Heterogeneous Eects 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cohort x FA 0.0129 0.0128
(0.0208) (0.0209)
Cohort x FA grade 9 age 14 0.000557 -0.00575
(0.0222) (0.0230)
Cohort x FA grade 9 age 15 0.00912 0.0175
(0.0253) (0.0258)
Cohort x FA grade 9 age 16 0.0728 0.0351
(0.179) (0.140)
Cohort x FA grade 9 age 17 -0.166*** -0.141***
(0.0237) (0.0308)
Cohort x FA grade 9 age 18 -0.0294 -0.0355*
(0.0176) (0.0192)
Cohort x FA grade 10 age 14 0.000567 0.00271
(0.0229) (0.0278)
Cohort x FA grade 10 age 15 0.0539 0.0510*
(0.0319) (0.0279)
Cohort x FA grade 10 age 16 0.105** 0.131***
(0.0485) (0.0394)
Cohort x FA grade 10 age 17 0.0192 0.122
(0.0283) (0.104)
Cohort x FA grade 10 age 18 -0.0913*** -0.0922***
(0.0238) (0.0221)
Cohort x FA grade 11 age 15 -0.0259 -0.0155
(0.0268) (0.0277)
Cohort x FA grade 11 age 17 -0.0408 -0.0168
(0.0517) (0.0700)
Cohort x FA grade 11 age 18 -0.0641* -0.134*
(0.0334) (0.0653)
Cohort x SE -0.0434** -0.0433**
(0.0198) (0.0198)
Cohort x SE grade 9 age 14 -0.0289 -0.0213
(0.0239) (0.0223)
Cohort x SE grade 9 age 15 -0.0544** -0.0548***
(0.0210) (0.0188)
Cohort x SE grade 9 age 16 0.0427 0.0268
(0.193) (0.159)
Cohort x SE grade 9 age 17 -0.115** -0.0636***
(0.0429) (0.0219)
Cohort x SE grade 10 age 14 -0.0578* -0.0483
(0.0302) (0.0289)
Cohort x SE grade 10 age 15 -0.0332 -0.0390*
(0.0218) (0.0193)
Cohort x SE grade 10 age 16 -0.0586 -0.0952*
(0.0513) (0.0534)
Cohort x SE grade 10 age 17 -0.111** -0.181
(0.0436) (0.121)
Cohort x SE grade 10 age 18 -0.0533** -0.0547**
(0.0218) (0.0209)
Cohort x SE grade 11 age 15 -0.0637** -0.0533**
(0.0227) (0.0212)
Cohort x SE grade 11 age 16 -0.0168 -0.0195
(0.0323) (0.0314)
Cohort x SE grade 11 age 17 -0.0957** -0.0846
(0.0395) (0.0498)
Cohort x SE grade 11 age 18 -0.00719 0.0970
(0.0947) (0.117)
Observations 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345
Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Cohort and school xed eects included in all regressions
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
25Table 14. Robustness Checks 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benchmark Placeboy Bootstrap Drop out Young Sister
Cohort x FA 0.0129 0.0134 0.0129 -0.00405 -0.00348
(0.0208) (0.0479) (0.0290) (0.0173) (0.0229)
Cohort x SE -0.0434** -0.0393 -0.0434** -0.0364* -0.0330*
(0.0198) (0.0442) (0.0184) (0.0205) (0.0169)
Observations 2,345 1,251 2,345 2,838 2,193
Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
y Placebo cohort
Cohort and school xed eects included in all regressions
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
Table 15. Robustness Checks 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Benchmark Without Without Without
19, 20, 21 28 - 32 14, 28 - 32
Cohort x FA 0.0129 -0.000670 -0.00551 -0.00345
(0.0208) (0.0563) (0.0618) (0.0599)
Cohort x SE -0.0434** -0.083400** -0.11300*** -0.15500***
(0.0198) (0.0335) (0.0391) (0.0435)
Observations 2,345 890 759 598
Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Cohort and school xed eects included in all regressions
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
Table 16. Robustness Checks 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Benchmark P30th P40th P50th
Cohort x FA 0.0129 0.00607 0.0239 0.0155
(0.0208) (0.0409) (0.0232) (0.0214)
Cohort x SED -0.0434** -0.0379* -0.0409** -0.0380*
(0.0198) (0.0186) (0.0166) (0.0181)
Observations 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345
Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Cohort and school xed eects included in all regressions
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
26Table 17. Household Eects
(1) (2) (3)
Cohort x FA 0.0129 0.0334 0.0518*
(0.0208) (0.0217) (0.0273)
Cohort x FA Mother was a Teenage Mother -0.0567*
(0.0287)
Cohort x FA HH Size -0.00635**
(0.00277)
Cohort x SE -0.0434** -0.0584*** -0.0632**
(0.0198) (0.0184) (0.0298)
Cohort x SE Mother was a Teenage Mother -0.0106
(0.0231)
Cohort x SE HH Size 0.00351
(0.00515)
Observations 2,345 1,577 2,345
Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Cohort and school xed eects included in all regressions
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
27Table 18. General Results: All Coecients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cohort -0.0160* 0.0815*** 0.0839*** 0.0761*** 0.0648***
(0.00843) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0127) (0.0145)
FA -0.125*** -0.0976*** -0.132*** 0.0957*** 0.107***
(0.00785) (0.00930) (0.0258) (0.0237) (0.0287)
SE 0.406*** -0.135*** -0.0554*** 0.407*** -0.0238
(0.00991) (0.0118) (0.00981) (0.0129) (0.0293)
Cohort x FA 0.0176 0.0130 0.0128 0.00892 0.0129
(0.0165) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0188) (0.0208)
Cohort x SE -0.0453** -0.0479** -0.0482** -0.0454** -0.0434**
(0.0208) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0198)
SE x FA -0.396*** 0.133*** 0.102*** -0.567*** -0.290***
(0.0125) (0.0153) (0.0269) (0.0213) (0.0322)
Cohort x SE x FA 0.0238 0.0225 0.0224 0.0284 0.0297
(0.0259) (0.0292) (0.0294) (0.0297) (0.0310)
Age 0.0151*** 0.0155*** 0.0153*** 0.0155***
(0.00169) (0.00168) (0.00165) (0.00166)
Standard of living -0.000133 -0.000135 -0.000133
(0.00171) (0.00171) (0.00171)
HH Size 0.00404 0.00398 0.00401
(0.00361) (0.00359) (0.00359)
Children -0.00506 -0.00502 -0.00505
(0.00307) (0.00306) (0.00307)














School FE X X X X X
Age X X X X
Family controls X X X
School controls X X
Localidad X
Observations 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345 2,345
Standard errors clustered by localidad
***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
28Table 19. Treatments and covariates
Total Fam. Acci on (FA) Subs. Educ. (SE)
Control Treated Control Treated
Age Old Cohort 21.823 21.856 21.745 21.909 21.709
Young Cohort 15.495 15.433 15.646 15.481 15.514
Total 18.871 18.838 18.947 18.917 18.810
Standard of living Old Cohort 22.901 23.869 20.681 23.679 21.876
Young Cohort 23.028 24.001 20.695 23.823 21.992
Total 22.960 23.931 20.688 23.746 21.930
HH Size Old Cohort 5.658 5.520 5.974 5.546 5.806
Young Cohort 5.578 5.418 5.960 5.452 5.741
Total 5.620 5.472 5.967 5.502 5.775
Children Old Cohort 3.718 3.485 4.253 3.496 4.009
Young Cohort 3.593 3.354 4.168 3.401 3.844
Total 3.660 3.423 4.214 3.452 3.932
Rooms Old Cohort 4.313 4.414 4.082 4.487 4.085
Young Cohort 4.303 4.407 4.053 4.460 4.097
Total 4.308 4.411 4.068 4.474 4.091
Students-teacher Old Cohort 30.554 29.827 32.219 30.909 30.086
Young Cohort 27.041 26.399 28.580 26.191 28.149
Total 28.915 28.216 30.550 28.713 29.179
Sch-quality Old Cohort 330.184 341.650 303.903 339.987 317.276
Young Cohort 330.625 341.369 304.866 340.478 317.785
Total 330.390 341.518 304.345 340.216 317.514
Private Old Cohort 0.255 0.328 0.087 0.449 0.000
Young Cohort 0.261 0.330 0.093 0.460 0.000
Total 0.258 0.329 0.090 0.454 0.000
Distance Old Cohort 1981.257 1662.367 2712.186 2121.354 1796.795
Young Cohort 1943.588 1641.334 2668.247 2077.276 1769.371
Total 1963.683 1652.484 2692.032 2100.840 1783.961
Person theft Old Cohort 0.821 0.930 0.570 0.904 0.710
Young Cohort 1.463 1.669 0.970 1.614 1.266
Total 1.120 1.277 0.753 1.235 0.970
Motorcycle theft Old Cohort 0.167 0.190 0.113 0.177 0.153
Young Cohort 0.136 0.156 0.087 0.143 0.126
Total 0.152 0.174 0.101 0.161 0.140
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
29Table 20. Treatments Frequency by Grade
Total Fam. Acci on (FA) Subs. Educ. (SE)
Control Treated Control Treated
Grade 9 Old Cohort 53.32% 35.84% 17.48% 29.87% 23.45%
Young Cohort 46.68% 31.42% 15.27% 26.33% 20.35%
Total 100.00% 67.26% 32.74% 56.19% 43.81%
Grade 10 Old Cohort 53.86% 38.80% 15.06% 29.38% 24.48%
Young Cohort 46.14% 33.90% 12.24% 25.21% 20.93%
Total 100.00% 72.71% 27.29% 54.59% 45.41%
Grade 11 Old Cohort 52.97% 36.43% 16.54% 31.23% 21.75%
Young Cohort 47.03% 32.81% 14.22% 27.32% 19.70%
Total 100.00% 69.24% 30.76% 58.55% 41.45%
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
Table 21. Treatments frequency by Grade
Total Fam. Acci on (FA) Subs. Educ. (SE)
Control Treated Control Treated
Grade 9 Old Cohort 241 162 79 135 106
Young Cohort 211 142 69 119 92
Total 452 304 148 254 198
Grade 10 Old Cohort 440 317 123 240 200
Young Cohort 377 277 100 206 171
Total 817 594 223 446 371
Grade 11 Old Cohort 570 392 178 336 234
Young Cohort 506 353 153 294 212
Total 1076 745 331 630 446
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
30Table 22. Treatments Frequency by Grade and Age {
Young Cohort
Total Fam. Acci on (FA) Subs. Educ (SE)
Control Treated Control Treated
Grade 9 Age 14 100.00% 68.46% 31.54% 57.05% 42.95%
Age 15 100.00% 68.29% 31.71% 53.66% 46.34%
Age 16 100.00% 46.15% 53.85% 53.85% 46.15%
Age 17 100.00% 83.33% 16.67% 50.00% 50.00%
Age 18 100.00% 50.00% 50.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Grade 10 Age 14 100.00% 73.17% 26.83% 63.41% 36.59%
Age 15 100.00% 78.13% 21.88% 52.08% 47.92%
Age 16 100.00% 70.59% 29.41% 55.88% 44.12%
Age 17 100.00% 50.00% 50.00% 46.67% 53.33%
Age 18 100.00% 80.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00%
Grade 11 Age 14 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Age 15 100.00% 77.27% 22.73% 55.68% 44.32%
Age 16 100.00% 72.93% 27.07% 60.90% 39.10%
Age 17 100.00% 63.87% 36.13% 52.94% 47.06%
Age 18 100.00% 43.75% 56.25% 59.38% 40.63%
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
Table 23. Treatments Frequency by Grade and Age {
Young Cohort
Total Fam. Acci on (FA) Subs. Educ. (SE)
Control Treated Control Treated
Grade 9 Age 14 149 102 47 85 64
Age 15 41 28 13 22 19
Age 16 13 6 7 7 6
Age 17 6 5 1 3 3
Age 18 2 1 1 2 0
Grade 10 Age 14 82 60 22 52 30
Age 15 192 150 42 100 92
Age 16 68 48 20 38 30
Age 17 30 15 15 14 16
Age 18 5 4 1 2 3
Grade 11 Age 14 1 1 0 1 0
Age 15 87 67 20 48 39
Age 16 266 194 72 162 104
Age 17 119 76 43 63 56
Age 18 32 14 18 19 13
See Table 1 for the meaning of each variable
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